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Introduction
During recent decades, economists' interest in gender-related issues has risen. Researchers
aim to show how economic theory can be applied to gender related topics such as peer
eﬀect, labor market outcomes, marriage and divorce, and education. This dissertation
aims to contribute to our understandings of the interaction, inequality and sources of
diﬀerences across genders, and it consists of three empirical papers in the research area
of gender economics.
The aim of the ﬁrst paper ("Separating gender composition eﬀect from peer eﬀects in
education") is to demonstrate the importance of considering endogenous peer eﬀects in or-
der to identify gender composition eﬀect. This fact is analytically illustrated by employing
Manski's (1993) linear-in-means model. The paper derives an innovative solution to the
simultaneous identiﬁcation of endogenous and exogenous peer eﬀects: gender composition
eﬀect of interest is estimated from auxiliary reduced-form estimates after identifying the
endogenous peer eﬀect by using Graham (2008) variance restriction method. The paper
applies this methodology to two diﬀerent data sets in order to identify both endogenous
and pure gender composition eﬀects in American and Italian schools.
The motivation of the second paper ("Gender diﬀerences in vulnerability to an eco-
nomic crisis") is to analyze the diﬀerent eﬀect of recent economic crisis on the labor
market outcome of men and women. Using triple diﬀerences method (before-after crisis,
harder-milder hit sectors, men-women) the paper used British data at the occupation
level and shows that men suﬀer more than women in terms of probability of losing their
job. Several explanations for the ﬁndings are proposed.
The third paper ("Gender gap in educational outcome") is concerned with a contro-
versial academic debate on the existence, degree and origin of the gender gap in test
scores. The existence of a gap both in mean scores and the variability around the mean
is documented and analyzed. The origins of the gap are investigated by looking at wide
range of possible explanations (namely, parental expectation, diﬀerences in measures of
local social capital, cultural diﬀerences between natives and immigrants, and diﬀerences
in response to the school resources)
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Chapter 1
Separating Gender Composition Eﬀect
from Peer Eﬀect in Education
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to highlight the importance of considering endogenous peer eﬀects,
as deﬁned by Manski (1993), in order to identify gender composition eﬀect on education
outcome appropriately. Using Manski (1993) linear-in-means model, this paper illustrates
that the gender composition eﬀect that is currently estimated in education function is the
function of three parameters: social multiplier, gender diﬀerences in outcome and gender
composition eﬀect (known as a gender peer eﬀect). The appropriate gender peer eﬀect
is identiﬁed after using Graham's variance restriction method to identify and rule out a
social multiplier eﬀect. The ﬁndings suggest that a social multiplier plays a crucial role in
learning process for Italian secondary and US primary students, although a gender peer
eﬀect is not as important as highlighted in previous literatures (Hoxby, 2000; Whitmore,
2005; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) .
Keywords: Social interaction, social multiplier, gender peer eﬀect, INVALSI, Project
STAR.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: I21, J16
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I Introduction
Pupils attending school may develop their skills and abilities by receiving inputs coming
from a variety of sources: teachers, school facilities, parental investments, environment
and neighborhood, as well as their peers at school. The relationship between peers'
interaction at school and educational outcome has attracted researchers' interest since the
Coleman report (Coleman et al., 1966), which was the ﬁrst empirical study on peer eﬀects
at school. Subsequently, a large and multidisciplinary literature has focused on pupil's
schoolmate's background characteristics and abilities and their achievement at school.
Several years after Manski (1993) formally discussed the diﬃculties in the identiﬁcation
of social interaction, which are potentially relevant to the study of the peer eﬀect in
education (Epple and Romano, 2011). In his seminal paper, Manski (1993) expressed
three hypotheses 1 that are often used to explain the conformity of individual behavior
with that of the group to which they belong. He pointed to the simultaneity problem that
arises when there are both endogenous and exogenous social interactions.
Since Manski (1993), the identiﬁcation of social interaction among schoolmates, com-
monly referred to as peer eﬀects, has emerged as a controversial topic among socio-
economic scholars. On one hand, theoretical researchers have proposed methods for the
identiﬁcation of social interaction (Graham, 2008; Brock and Durlauf, 2001); on the other
hand, the empirical scholars (Zimmerman, 2003; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Hoxby, 2000;
Whitmore, 2005; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Ammermueller and
Pischke, 2006; Vigdor and Nechyba, 2004; Graham, 2008) have employed either experi-
mental or quasi-experimental research design to determine peer eﬀect.
Only few empirical studies focus on social interaction among schoolmates of a diﬀerent
1He separated peer eﬀect to three parts as following: endogenous eﬀect is the propensity of individual to
behave in some ways varies with the prevalence of that behavior in the individual's group, exogenous eﬀect
is the propensity of individual to behave in some way varies with the characteristics of the individual's
group and correlated eﬀect is when individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they
have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional environments (Epple and Romano,
2011).
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gender, referred to as 'gender peer eﬀects' and is commonly proxied by gender composition
eﬀect (Hoxby, 2000; Whitmore, 2005; Kang, 2007; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011). One such
study is that of Hoxby (2000), who identiﬁes idiosyncratic variation in the number of girls
and achievement of students by comparing adjacent cohorts' gender and racial groups'
shares. She estimated gender and race peer eﬀects in Texas elementary schools, ﬁnding
that boys and girls have higher test scores when classrooms have a larger number of female
students.
Whitmore (2005) studies the share of female students on academic achievements; how-
ever, unlike Hoxby (2000) her ﬁndings are mixed (positive in kindergarten and second
grade, zero in ﬁrst grade and negative in third grade). In her studies Tennessee's Project
STAR's randomized experiment in which gender variation generated by the random as-
signment of students into classrooms is exploited.
Most recently, Lavy and Schlosser (2011) estimated the eﬀects of classroom gender
composition on the scholastic achievements of boys and girls in Israeli primary, middle
and high schools. Following Hoxby (2000), the authors relied on idiosyncratic variations
in the proportion of female students across adjacent cohorts within the same school. They
found that the proportion of girls in a class has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
academic achievements of both girls and boys in high school, with the size of the estimated
eﬀects being similar for both genders. Furthermore, their exploration of the gender peer
eﬀect mechanism indicates that a higher proportion of females in a class lead to a better
classroom and learning environment.
My study contributes to diﬀerent strands of literature. First, it supplements existing
literature on the identiﬁcation of a gender peer eﬀect (Hoxby, 2000; Whitmore, 2005; Lavy
and Schlosser, 2011). However, my approach departs from other literature mentioned
above by distinguishing between the gender peer eﬀect (i.e. the variable that was aimed
to be identiﬁed initially) and other determinants of the gender composition's coeﬃcient in
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regression function (i.e. the gender diﬀerences in outcome and social multiplier)2. Hoxby
(2000) claims that "when the groups are males and females (unlike racial group), there
is no neat test of whether a group's peer eﬀects all operate through peer achievement".
Within Manski's framework, this means one cannot separate the exogenous eﬀect of having
more females in the classroom from the fact that females might be better peers and
have higher scores. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) do not consider the spillover eﬀects of
pupils' achievements in investigating the overall payoﬀ from all the possible mechanisms
through which gender peer eﬀects might be at play; instead, their analysis is limited to
the few channels through which a gender peer eﬀect might be at work. Whitmore (2005)
mentions that having a predominately female class in the second grade substantially
increases students' test scores, which can only be partly explained by being exposed to
higher quality peers (as girls' scores are higher than those of boys). Therefore, she claims
that there should be something further about having a predominately female class per se,
although her study does not precisely distinguish between diﬀerent possible eﬀects.
Second, I contribute to the parts of the literature on social interaction that aim to
overcome the 'reﬂection problem' 3 in order to estimate the eﬀects of the endogenous
social multiplier in a quasi-experimental framework. Finally, to my knowledge this is the
ﬁrst paper to estimate a social multiplier in an Italian school.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
concept to show the problem of identiﬁcation based on Manski's linear-in-means model.
Section 3 suggests the empirical strategies to solve the identiﬁcation problems, while
section 4 presents the data set. Section 5 presents the results, before section 6 summarizes
the ﬁndings and provides a brief conclusion.
2 Other determinants can be derived from applying Manski's linear-in-means model to the gender peer
eﬀect framework, as further described in Chapter 2.
3 The term "reﬂection problem" is used to characterize the simultaneity problem that arises when
there are both endogenous and exogenous social interaction Epple and Romano (2011)
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II Gender peer eﬀect in linear-in-means form
In order to show the identiﬁcation problem of estimating a gender peer eﬀect, I assume
that a social interaction takes the linear-in-means form as in Manski (1993). Assume:
yci = α0 + α1xi + α2xc + βy¯c + ci (1.1)
Where; In each grade, denote classes with c and individual with i. y is individual achieve-
ment in school, xi is a dummy variable denoting the gender of individual i, which is equal
to 1 if i is a girl. xc is the proportion of girls in each class (i.e. E(xi|c)), y¯c is the average
achievement of individual i in the class, ci are unobserved attributes that directly aﬀect
y. Following Manski (1993), I assume E(ci|c, xi) = c′σ, which captures the correlated
eﬀect.
One should note the two important restrictions associated with the speciﬁcation in-
troduced above. Firstly, it is implicitly assumed that the gender composition eﬀect is
identical across gender, and secondly, the endogenous eﬀect is homogenous across gender,
meaning that the average achievement of an individual aﬀects all the students identically,
regardless of their gender. The ﬁrst assumption is veriﬁed by looking at the results of
previous literature in the ﬁeld (Whitmore, 2005; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011). Both Hoxby
(2000) and Lavy and Schlosser (2011) ﬁndings show that the proportion of girls in the
classroom aﬀect both genders virtually identical, while the second assumption is logical
given that the gender composition eﬀect is internalized in the model as an exogenous peer
eﬀect.
Average achievement within a class leads to:
y¯c = α0/(1− β) + 1/(1− β)(α1 + α2)xc + 1/(1− β)c′σ (1.2)
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A reduced form is obtained by replacing Eq. (1.2) into Eq. (1.1):
yci = γα0 + α1xi + ((γ − 1)α1 + γα2)xc + γc′σ (1.3)
Where; γ = 1/(1 − β) is a social multiplier, namely the ratio between the average cu-
mulative response and the individual response following an exogenous shock. From Eq.
(1.3), one can clearly see the identiﬁcation problem that arises in the study of peer eﬀect,
as discussed by Manski (1993): by OLS regression of individual achievement on gender
composition in the classroom, only the composite parameters α0γ , α1, ((γ − 1)α1 + γα2)
and γσ are identiﬁed. Moreover, identiﬁcation of the composite parameters does not en-
able us to distinguish between the two social eﬀects (endogenous and exogenous ones).
As one can see from Eq. (1.3), based on Manski's linear-in-means model the coeﬃcient
that are estimated so far by regressing gender composition on educational outcome (i.e
((γ − 1)α1 + γα2)) is formed by three separate elements: the eﬀect of having more girls
in the classroom (α2) , the diﬀerence between girls and boys in educational outcome (α1)
and the social multiplier (γ).
III Empirical strategy
In order to solve the identiﬁcation problem mentioned in chapter 2, the social multiplier
(γ) is estimated ﬁrst, which allows driving a gender peer eﬀect that is solely due to the
existence of more girls in the class (α2) by estimating Eq. (1.3).
A Identiﬁcation of social multiplier
Graham (2008) proposed a method for the identiﬁcation of a social multiplier (γ in equa-
tion 1.3), by exploiting diﬀerences in variances across groups. For a linear form of social
interaction, he deﬁned the unconditional between-group variance of means outcome as
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the sum of the variance of any group level heterogeneity (classroom certain characteris-
tics such as teacher quality), between-group variance of any individual-level heterogeneity
(variability in average student ability) and the strength of any social interaction (peer ef-
fect). Therefore, in the presence of social interaction, between-group variation in outcome
should reﬂex between-group variation in 'peer quality'. Following Galbiati and Zanella
(2012), we can rewrite the reduced form model from equations (1.2) and (1.3) in vari-
ance components. The transformation of group-level heterogeneity (αc=α2 girls + σc′),
individual-level heterogeneity (ci=α1 gender) and the group level average of individual-
level heterogeneity (¯c= α1girls) yields the following behavioral equations:
yci = γαc + ci + (γ − 1)¯c (1.4)
y¯c = γ(αc + ¯c) (1.5)
Graham (2008) proved that under some speciﬁc assumptions discussed below, γ2 can be
identiﬁed by using the following conditional and unconditional restrictions:
E[Gbc − θW2c − γ2Gwc |W1c,W2c] = 0 (1.6)
E[
(
W1c
W2c
)
(Gbc − θW2c − γ2Gwc )] = 0 (1.7)
Where; W1c and W2c are two vectors containing observable classroom-level information,
W1c denotes class size (small vs. large) andW2c denotes other classroom-level information
such as the share of educated parents, share of immigrants in the classroom, etc. Gwc
and Gbc are within- and between- group statistics, respectively. (For more details, see
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supplement part of Graham (2008) and Galbiati and Zanella (2012)).
Eq.(1.7) delivers the appropriate speciﬁcation to estimate (i.e. by GMM) the social
multiplier, γ2, using W1c as an instrumental variable.
The three primitive assumptions that guarantee identiﬁcation are as follows:
• Independent Random Assignment: Teacher and students' assignment to classroom
must be random.
• Stochastic Separability: The population variance of small and large classroom teacher
eﬀectiveness must be the same.
• Peer Quality Variation: This is a rank restriction, which requires that the variance
of peer quality diﬀers between the two types of classrooms.
B Identiﬁcation of composite parameters
The model based on Eq. (1.3) suggests that regression of "gender composition" on edu-
cational outcome delivers the coeﬃcient of the following form:
δ = (γ − 1)α1 + γα2 (1.8)
δ is estimated for two case studies, namely the US and Italy. The ﬁrst case study
is based on a randomized experiment, while, for the second case study, idiosyncratic
variation in gender composition across adjacent cohort is employed in order to gain a
clean estimate of δ.
C Identiﬁcation of gender peer eﬀect
In order to recover a gender peer eﬀect and its standard deviation, a bootstrapping method
is used to approximate the distribution of a statistic by a Monte Carlo simulation.
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IV Data
The empirical analysis is based on two case studies: elementary school students in the
US and secondary students in Italy. The reasons for including two diﬀerent case studies
are threefold. Firstly, in order to investigate the gender peer eﬀect in both primary and
secondary schools. Secondly, in order to gain a better understanding of the importance of
endogenous eﬀects by comparing my results with those from Hoxby (2000) and Whitmore
(2005), two main contributions to existing literature on gender peer eﬀect. And ﬁnally,
the Italian case study is very applicable in order to introduce a method for investigating
social multiplier in a non-experimental framework.
A US
The assessment of gender peer eﬀect in the learning process is conducted by using data
from the class size reduction experiment Project STAR. According to Word et al. (1990),
Project STAR was started in the fall of 1985, whereby kindergarten students were ran-
domly assigned to one of three class types within their school: small, regular and regular
with a full-time teacher's aide. Thereafter, teachers were randomly assigned to one of
these three class types.
The within-school randomization was implemented in 79 schools and ultimately in-
cluded 11,600 students. In the experiment, a single cohort of children was assigned to
small or regular classes from kindergarten through to third grade, before all students
returned to regular sized classes in fourth grade.
B Italy
For the Italian primary students, the data requirements are fulﬁlled by the INVALSI data
set for the universe of Italian primary and secondary schools in the academic years 2009-
10 and 2010-2011. INVALSI (the National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education
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System) is in charge of designing and administering standardized education tests in Italy.
Since 2008, the tests have been administered on an annual basis.
The recent waves of this data set collected data for the population of primary and
lower secondary students in their second, ﬁfth, sixth and eighth Italian grades. For each
student, the data set contains information on class size and grade in the school, immigrant
status based on citizenship and language spoken at home, test scores in Italian and Math,
gender, age and family background information.
Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 present the number of observations, the mean, the standard
deviation, and the minimum and the maximum values of math and reading scores of
boys, girls and the overall population for second, ﬁfth and eighth graders, respectively.
For example, the ﬁfth graders standardized reading test had a mean of around 0.7 points
and a standard deviation of around 0.17 points in 2009-2010. The average female scored
0.02 points  around a 0.12 standard deviation  higher than the average male.
V Results
A Social multiplier and gender peer eﬀect in US primary schools
Full details on the validity of identiﬁcation assumptions one need to identify social mul-
tiplier with experiment Project STAR are provided by Graham (2008). However, he
limited his analysis to kindergarten students. Table 1.4 reports Graham (2008) ﬁndings
for kindergarten students as well as the social multipliers that I assess for second and
third graders using Tennessee's Project STAR experiment. The estimations of social mul-
tipliers for second graders are 2.23 and 2.14 for math and reading, respectively, and the
standard errors of parameter recovered by using the delta method. These are almost the
same as estimated for kindergarten students. Third graders' social multipliers are 1.5 and
2 for math and reading, respectively, which suggests that a social multiplier might be less
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determinant for upper graders. The ﬁrst graders are ruled out from the analysis, given
that, according to Whitmore (2005), kindergarten was not required in Tennessee at the
time of Project STAR, and consequently there was a large inﬂux of new entrants in ﬁrst
grade of signiﬁcantly lower quality than kindergarten entrants who might have disrupted
classrooms.
The estimations of gender peer eﬀects are presented in table 1.5. After accounting for
the roles of a social multiplier and the diﬀerences between gender in outcome, gender peer
eﬀects lost most of their initial magnitude. However, one should note that, in the cases
where social multipliers are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, social interactions are not
at place, and the female share coeﬃcient (δ) reﬂects the gender peer eﬀect coeﬃcient (α2).
It is important to highlight that a bootstrapping method is used to approximate the
distribution of a statistic by a Monte Carlo simulation in order to recover the gender peer
eﬀect and its standard deviation.
B Social multiplier and gender peer eﬀect in Italy primary and
secondary schools
In order to identify the social multiplier among Italian students, the discontinuity in the
relationship between enrollment and class size at an enrollment multiple of 25, which is
induced by the so-called "Maimonides' rule"4, is employed. This discontinuity induced
classes of diﬀerent sizes, prompting the need to employ Graham's method. Tables 1.6 and
1.7 and panel B of table 1.3 show descriptive statistics for the grades with enrollments in a
range close to the points of discontinuity. These are the grades with enrollment in the set of
intervals {[22, 30], [47, 55], [72, 80], [97, 105], [122, 130], [147, 155], [172, 180], [197, 205], [222, 230],
, [247, 255], [272, 280], [297, 305], [322, 330], [347, 355], [372, 380], [397, 404]}. Around 17 per-
cent of the total grades are in these intervals after accounting for a +10% margin of ﬂexi-
4 This term was ﬁrst used by Angrist and Lavy (1999).
24 CHAPTER 1. GENDER PEER EFFECT IN EDUCATION
bility 5. As is shown in the tables, the average characteristics of classes in the discontinuity
sample are remarkably similar to those for the full sample.
Assumptions veriﬁcation
In this section, I assess the three required assumptions in order to identify social multi-
plier: peer quality variation, independent random assignment and stochastic separability.
The approach adopted here is based on non-experimental methods in evaluation research
(Campbell, 1969): regression discontinuity design. This method utilizes verifying the
necessary assumptions in order to estimate social multiplier appropriately.
1. Peer Quality Variation The idea of using RDD to identify class size eﬀect comes
from what Angrist and Lavy (1999) termed Maimonides' rule, in which they exploit
the fact that class size is partly determined by a known discontinuity function of
observed covariates (enrollment in a grade). For my purpose, the importance of
Maimonides' rule is that it has been used to determine the division of enrollment
grades into classes in Italian public schools. Based on Italian law, class size cannot
be larger than 25, with a margin of ﬂexibility of +10 percent. Moreover, it cannot be
smaller than 10, with a margin of ﬂexibility of -10%. Let Z be the total enrollment in
a grade and C the number of classes; subsequently, the rule for class size disregarding
the margins of ﬂexibility is:
S¯ =
Z
Int(Z−1
25
) + 1
(1.9)
Where lnt(x) is the largest integer smaller or equal to x. Based on equation (1.9),
the theoretical class size is a function of grade (in a particular school) enrollment,
which displays discontinuities at multiples of 25. We can see the predicted and
actual class size in Italian elementary school in ﬁgure 2.1 (taken from Ballatore
5For example, for the ﬁrst interval enrollment that contains 25 and 26 students is excluded
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et al. (2012)).
Figure 1.1: Predicted and actual class size in Italy
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Note: Each graph shows the predicted (red line) and actual (black line) class size in diﬀerent grades
On the left of each threshold, the theoretical class size is larger than on the right,
with this feature of the rule oﬀering a source of variation in peer equality. As I
will show in the next section, the variance of peer quality indeed diﬀers between
two types of the classroom. Therefore, one of the three assumptions is required for
identiﬁcation to be veriﬁed (i.e. rank condition is satisﬁed).
2. Independent Random Assignment 6
The attractive feature of RDD is the fact that it allows testing the validity of its
identiﬁcation condition, which is parallel to the assumption of independent random
assignment. The condition for identiﬁcation based on RDD requires that no discon-
tinuity takes place at the threshold for selection in the counterfactual world. This
is called the orthogonality condition, which is as follows:
6this assumption is also called double randomization assumption, which means students and teachers
should independently and randomly assigned to the classroom
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(Y 1, Y 0) ⊥ I|S = s (1.10)
Where (Y1, Y0) are the two potential outcomes. I is the binary variable that de-
notes treatment status, with I = 1 for small classroom and I = 0 for larger ones.
Treatment status depends on an observable unit characteristic S (enrollment), and
there exists a known point in the support of S where the probability of participation
changes discontinuously (enrollment equal to 25).
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 present the test for this assumption based on the idea of com-
paring units marginally above and below the threshold with respect to variables
whereby:
• cannot be aﬀected by the treatment;
• are aﬀected by the same unobservable that is relevant for the outcome.
With few exceptions, the evidences in tables 1.8 and 1.9 suggest that the existence of
discontinuities in pre-treatment variables is unlikely to be correlated with potential
outcomes. To conﬁrm this result and ensure that the exceptions in tables 1.8 and
1.9 are only a spurious correlations, table 1.10 indicates the Pearson's chi-squared
Test for the random assignment of girls in the classroom. This test was ﬁrst used
by Ammermueller and Pischke (2006). The results of the test suggest that girls are
randomly spread across the classes of diﬀerent size, which provides further evidence
in support of an "Independent Random Assignment" (for eighth graders, only a
Pearson's chi- squared Test for all the country is measurable due to limitations in
the data set).
The evidences in tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 allow one to reject the presence of discon-
tinuities in pre-treatment variables that are likely to be correlated with potential
outcomes. In other words, the schools below and above the threshold are compara-
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ble.
3. Stochastic separability
This assumption states that the teacher eﬀectiveness variation across two types of
classroom must be equal, and is not valid if the distribution of teacher characteris-
tics is not similar across classrooms of diﬀerent sizes. As we compare classes with
diﬀerent size across diﬀerent schools, it is very unlikely that teachers are sorted
across classes. However, to further test this assumption, a sensitivity analysis test
suggested by Graham (2008) is performed. The results of the sensitivity analysis
test suggest that the typical diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness across a pair of teachers would
have to be implausibly large in small versus large classrooms to produce social mul-
tiplier estimates of the size reported in table 1.11, if, in fact, there were no peer
eﬀects. (For details of sensitivity analysis, see supplement to Graham (2008))
Results
Table 1.11 reports the estimate of γ2 using 2009-2010 wave of INVALSI dataset for the
second, ﬁfth and eighth graders by estimating equation 1.7. The ﬁrst, third and ﬁfth
columns report the results for math and the second, fourth and sixth for reading (Italian).
The estimates of a social multiplier are 2.8, 1.88 and 3.24 for math and 1.52, 3.03 and 3.85
for reading in the second, ﬁfth and eighth grades, respectively. These ﬁndings suggest that
social interaction plays an important role in the learning process. In contrast to the ﬁfth
and eighth graders, the null hypothesis that γ2 = 1 is not rejected at the 90% conﬁdence
level for second graders; therefore, one cannot reject the hypothesis of no peer interaction
for second graders.
Panel B of table 1.11 shows the ﬁrst stage results of the estimate. The coeﬃcient of
variable "small" is statistically signiﬁcant, which supports the ﬁrst assumption of peer
quality variation. The ﬁrst stage F- statistics is large, suggesting that the instrument
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is not weak. In order to check the robustness of the results, table 1.12 presents the
social multiplier calculated for the ﬁrst two thresholds (enrollments less than 60), with
the results proving robust across the two diﬀerent samples.
Following the empirical method employed by Hoxby (2000) and Lavy and Schlosser
(2011), gender peer eﬀects for Italian 8th graders (Eq. (1.3)) are estimated by relying
on idiosyncratic variation in gender composition across adjacent cohorts within the same
grade in the same school (eighth grade is the only grade whereby one can match cohorts
of adjacent years by using the Invalsi data set). This approach proposes a persuasive
solution for the two possible sources of confounding factors: self-selection of students into
the schools and correlation between school characteristics and gender composition.
The estimations of gender peer eﬀects for Italian students are presented in Table 1.13.
After considering the role of a social multiplier and the diﬀerences between genders in
terms of outcome, the gender peer eﬀect is relatively large and negatively signiﬁcant in
math and approximately zero and not signiﬁcant in reading. This is consistent with
the ﬁndings from Whitmore (2005)empirical study indicating that a peer eﬀect in school
deteriorates educational outcomes for upper grade females.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, I empirically measure the extent of gender peer eﬀects in Italian secondary
and US primary schools on students' academic achievements. Using Manski (1993) linear-
in-means model, I was able to disentangle two diﬀerent mechanisms through which a
higher proportion of females in the class might aﬀect students' academic achievements:
a social multiplier and a gender composition eﬀect. It is shown that the two mentioned
mechanisms, along with gender diﬀerences in outcome, form the gender composition co-
eﬃcient estimated to date by researchers in order to ﬁnd gender peer eﬀect in school on
academic achievement.
VI. CONCLUSION 29
The project STAR experiment allows identifying a gender peer eﬀect for US primary
students, while this is identiﬁed for Italian secondary students by using idiosyncratic
variation in gender composition across an adjacent cohort within the same school. In
order to disentangle the multiplier's eﬀect Graham (2008) conditional variance restriction
method is employed.
With one exception, the evidence provided in this paper suggests that a social in-
teraction plays a crucial role in the learning process for primary pupils in the US and
secondary pupils in Italy. However, the gender composition eﬀect is not as important as
previously thought, after accounting for a social multiplier and gender gap in the out-
come. The general implication of these ﬁndings is that in contrast to gender mix of class,
the spillover eﬀects of pupils' achievements should be taken into account in inter- and
intra-school resource allocation in elementary schools. Furthermore, ﬁndings show that
higher proportions of females in the math classroom deteriorate the educational outcome
of upper grade male pupils. Indeed, this is consistent with the ﬁndings from Whitmore
(2005) empirical study.
This study does not control for a heterogeneous social multiplier eﬀect across gender
and is unable to rule out the possibility that the female proportion in the classroom might
diﬀer in importance for education outcome between the two genders. However, the results
provide important insight towards understanding the relative role of a social multiplier
and gender composition eﬀect.
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VII Tables chapter 1
Table 1.1: Discriptive statistics - grade 2
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max var
A. 2009-2010
Grade 2: 5969 schools,22745 classes
All score math .62 .2 0 .46 .6 .78 1 .04
All score ita .66 .23 0 .5 .69 .85 1 .053
boy score math .63 .2 0 .46 .61 .79 1 .04
boy score ita .64 .23 0 .46 .69 .85 1 .054
girl score math .62 .2 0 .46 .61 .79 1 .04
girl score ita .67 .23 0 .5 .73 .85 1 .051
class size 20.6 3.6 11 18 21 23 35 13
disadvantaged
B.2010-2011
Grade 2: 7337 schools, 26628 classes
All score math .66 .19 0 .53 .68 .78 1 .037
All score ita .72 .19 0 .6 .76 .86 1 .035
boy score math .66 .19 0 .53 .68 .82 1 .037
boy score ita .71 .19 0 .6 .76 .87 1 .035
girl score math .65 .19 0 .53 .64 .78 1 .037
girl score ita .73 .18 0 .63 .76 .87 1 .03
class size 19 3.8 11 17 20 22 35 14.7
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test
is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
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Table 1.2: Discriptive Statistics - grade 5
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max var
A. 2009-2010
Grade 5: 5937 schools, 22846 class
All score math .65 .18 0 .52 .66 .79 1 .034
All score ita .7 .17 0 .59 .74 .84 1 .03
boy score math .66 .19 0 .52 .68 .82 1 .035
boy score ita .69 .18 0 .58 .72 .83 1 .031
girl score math .64 .18 0 .5 .64 .77 1 .033
girl score ita .71 .17 0 .61 .74 .84 1 .03
class size 20.8 3.7 11 18 21 24 35 13.8
B. 2010-2011
Grade 5: 7374 schools, 27303 classes
All score math 0.69 .17 0 .59 .72 .83 1 .028
All score ita .74 .14 0 .65 .75 .85 1 .02
boy score math .7 .16 0 .59 .72 .83 1 .02
boy score ita .73 .15 0 .65 .75 .84 1 .02
girl score math .69 .17 0 .57 .7 .83 1 .028
girl score ita .74 .14 0 .65 .77 .85 1 .02
class size 19 3.8 11 17 19 22 35 14.4
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test
is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
Table 1.3: Discriptive statistics - grade 8
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max var
A. 2009-2010 full sample
Grade 8: 3760 schools, 21577 classes
All score math .49 .18 0 .36 .47 .62 1 .03
All score ita .68 .17 0 .57 .71 .81 1 .03
boy score math .51 .19 0 .38 .5 .66 1 .035
boy score ita .65 .18 0 .55 .69 .79 1 .033
girl score math .46 .17 0 .34 .45 .58 1 .029
girl score ita .7 .16 0 .61 .73 .82 1 .026
class size 20 4.3 11 17 21 24 33 18.7
B. 2009-2010 discontinuity sample
Grade 5: 613 schools, 3604 classes
All score math .48 .18 0 .36 .47 .62 1 .03
All score ita .68 .18 0 .57 .71 .81 1 .032
boy score math .51 .19 0 .36 .5 .64 1 .035
boy score ita .65 .19 0 .54 .67 .79 1 .035
girl score math .46 .17 0 .34 .45 .58 1 .03
girl score ita .7 .16 0 .61 .74 .82 1 .027
class size 20 4.4 11 17 21 24 32 19.3
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test
is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
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Table 1.4: Social Multiplier in US
Kindergarten 2nd grade 3rd grade
Math Re Math Re Math Re
Gwc (coeﬃcient: γ
2) 3.47 5.28 5 4.58 2.26 4.05
(1.03) (2.48) (1.8) (2.1) (1.3) (1.04)
Social multiplier (γ) 1.86*** 2.3*** 2.23*** 2.14*** 1.5*** 2.01***
(delta method) (0.27) (0.54) (0.4) (0.49) (0.44) (0.26)
p-value H0: γ
2= 1 0.018 0.086 0.02 0.09 0.34 0.004
B: First stage
F-stat. 46.8 19.0 57.08 38.88 45.58 56.7
Number of classroom 317 317 331 331 330 325
School ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 1.5: Gender peer eﬀect in US
Kindergarten 2nd grade 3rd grade
Math Re Math Re Math Re
Female Share(δ1) 0.42** 0.35** 0.24 0.503** -0.303 -0.33
(0.186) (0.17) (0.281) (0.250) (0.252) (0.26)
Gender peer eﬀect* 0.17*** 0.066*** 0.09*** 0.13*** -0.2*** -0.27***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Control
School ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Classroom type yes yes yes yes yes yes
Socio-economic statues yes yes yes yes yes yes
race yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5707 5629 5723 5731 5829 5751
R-squared 0.264 0.263 0.256 0.254 0.228 0.2
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
* a bootstrapping method is utilized to approximate the distribution of a statistic by a Monte Carlo
simulation.
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Table 1.6: Discriptive statistics - discontinuity sample grade 2
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max var
A. 2009-2010
Grade 2: 986 schools, 3632 classes
All score math .62 .2 0 .46 .6 .78 1 .04
All score ita .65 .23 0 .5 .69 .85 1 .05
boy score math .62 .2 0 .46 .61 .78 1 .04
boy score ita .64 .23 0 .46 .6 .78 1 .04
girl score math .62 .2 0 .46 .6 .75 1 .04
girl score ita .67 .23 0 .5 .73 .85 1 .05
class size 21 3.8 11 18 21 24 32 15
B. 2010-2011
Grade 2: 1162 schools, 4228 classes
All score math .66 .19 0 .53 .68 .82 1 .04
All score ita .72 .19 0 .6 .76 .87 1 .035
boy score math .66 .19 0 .53 .68 .82 1 .038
boy score ita .72 .19 0 .6 .76 .87 1 .035
girl score math .65 .19 0 .53 .68 .78 1 .037
girl score ita .73 .18 0 .63 .76 .87 1 .03
class size 19.6 4 11 17 20 23 30 16
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test
is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
Table 1.7: Discriptive Statistics - discontinuity sample grade 5
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max var
A. 2009-2010
Grade 5: 1021 schools, 3791 classes
All score math .65 .18 0 .52 .66 .79 1 .34
All score ita .7 .17 0 .59 .74 .84 1 .03
boy score math .66 .19 0 .52 .68 .82 1 .35
boy score ita .69 .17 0 .58 .72 .84 1 .03
girl score math .64 .18 0 .5 .64 .79 1 .03
girl score ita .71 .17 0 .6 .75 .84 1 .03
class size 21 3.9 11 18 21 24 29 15.3
B. 2010-2011
Grade 5: 1185 schools, 4371 classes
All score math .7 .17 0 .59 .72 .83 1 .028
All score ita .74 .14 0 .65 .77 .85 1 .02
boy score math .71 .17 0 .59 .72 .82 1 .03
boy score ita .74 .14 0 .65 .75 .85 1 .02
girl score math .69 .17 0 .59 .72 .83 1 .028
girl score ita .75 .14 0 .67 .77 .85 1 .019
class size 19 4 11 17 19 23 29 16
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test
is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
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Table 1.8: Random Allocation Test - discontinuity sample grade 2
Share with Share with Share with share of
VARIABLES high educated parents low skilled parents num of imigrants girls
gap at the threshold -0.008*** 0.001* -0.001 -0.006*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0035)
Observations 69067 69067 69067 68417
R-squared 0.002 0 0 0
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.9: Random allocation test-discontinuity sample grade 5
Share with Share with Share with share of
VARIABLES high educated parents low books at home num of imigrants girls
gap at the threshold 0 -0.009 0 -0.003
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 73822 73822 73822 73181
R-squared 0 0 0 0
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.10: Pearson's chi-squared Test for random assignment of girls in the classroom
Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 8
All the Country
Pearson's test statistics 1995.873 2424.859 313.6128
degree of freedom 2644 2770 2961
p-value 1 1 1
North
Pearson's test statistics 940 928
degree of freedom 1220 1130
p-value 1 1
Center
Pearson's test statistics 372 439
degree of freedom 477 492
p-value 1 0.96
South
Pearson's test statistics 682 911
degree of freedom 947 1148
p-value 1 1
Notes. The degrees of freedom are
∑S
s (nclass − 1)/J − 1 . S is
the total number of schools for a given grade and J is the number
of possible values taken by the characteristic one wants to test the
random assignment.
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Table 1.11: Social multiplier - Italy
2nd grade 5th grade 8th grade
Math Re Math Re Math Re
Gwc (coeﬃcient: γ
2) 7.86 2.33 3.55 9.21 10.5 14.8
(5) (0.9) (1.4) (1.3) (4.13) (2.9)
Social multiplier (γ) 2.8*** 1.52*** 1.88*** 3.03*** 3.24*** 3.85***
(delta method) (0.89) (0.29) (0.38) (0.22) (0.63) (0.38)
p-value H0: γ
2= 1 0.17 0.14 0.07 0 0.02 0
B: First stage
F-stat. 10.44 19.11 49.93 11.36 4.1e+10 1.2e+10
p-value 0.0012 0 0 0.0008 0 0
Number of classroom 3627 3623 3791 3791 3812 3811
School ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.12: Social Multiplier-Italy ﬁrst two threshold
2nd grade 5th grade 8th grade
Math Re Math Re Math Re
Gwc (coeﬃcient: γ
2) 7.86 2.33 3.55 9.21 7.77 10.84
(6.6) (1.2) (1.88) (1.76) (6.13) (4.05)
Social multiplier (γ) 2.8*** 1.52*** 1.88*** 3.03*** 2.78*** 3.29***
(delta method) (1.19) (0.39) (0.5) (0.29) (1.1) (0.6)
p-value H0: γ
2= 1 0.3 0.26 0.17 0 0.27 0.01
B: First stage
F-stat. 5.97 10.95 27.59 6.45 1.4e+12 8.3e+10
p-value 0.015 0.001 0 0.01 0
Number of classroom 785 788 817 817 281 282
School ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.13: Gender peer eﬀect eighth Italian graders
Math Re
Female Share(δ) -0.025 -0.22***
(0.08) (0.1)
Gender peer eﬀect* -0.56*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.003)
Control
School ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Time ﬁxed eﬀect yes yes
Observations 15102 15102
R-squared 0.8 0.7
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* a bootstrapping method is utilized to approximate the distribu-
tion of a statistic by a Monte Carlo simulation.
Chapter 2
Gender Diﬀerences in Vulnerability to
Economic Crisis
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the diﬀerent eﬀects of recent economic crisis on the unemploy-
ment rate of women and men. The aim of the study is to determine the vulnerable part
of the society that appropriate labor market policy should target during the crisis. UK
Labor Force Survey (LFS) data is used to examine both the level and the channels of the
crisis eﬀect. The fact that the crisis hit various sectors with considerably diﬀerent degree
is exploited in order to use triple diﬀerence method to measure the extent of the overall
diﬀerent eﬀect. Findings reveal that men are more vulnerable to the economic crisis when
compared to women. One explanation for our ﬁndings is that men are dominating the
lowest level occupational category of the most vulnerable sectors, and, that household
labor supply behavior does not explain the gap.
Keywords: great recession, unemployment rate, household supply behavior.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: J21, J22, J78
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I Introduction
Understanding changes in the labor market during the most recent downturn is the initial
step in creating pertinent policies to respond to future crisis. Female has traditionally been
the main victims of worse working conditions in comparison with male. Therefore, it is
important to understand if their conditions are hardening during the economic downturn
in order to take appropriate actions.
Whether economic crisis emphasizes or modiﬁes gender imbalances, is ambiguous. Cur-
rent literature mostly considers partial eﬀect rather than the overall eﬀect. One strand of
the literature emphasizes gender diﬀerences in providing labor supply during the economic
crisis (Mitchell, 1971; Bruegel, 1979; Rubery, 2010). The other strands study the ﬁrm
discriminatory behavior (Seguino et al., 2009; Verick and Islam, 2010) or occupational seg-
regation (Milkman, 1976; Johnson, 1983; Miller, 1990). The former group either supports
"added worker eﬀect" hypothesis (Bruegel, 1979; Rubery, 2010), or "discouraged-worker
eﬀect" (Mitchell, 1971). And, The latter one pointed to the role of occupational seg-
regation, for example, by considering a severe job losses in male dominated sectors, or
the ﬁrm's incentive to alter their discriminatory behavior, for example, by shedding more
female workers because they are less attached to the labor market.
The studies ﬁndings are inconculsive. They stress on merely one of the mechanism
through which crisis might lead to gender imbalance in labor market outcome. Moreover,
the ﬁndings are contradictory and ambiguous. Therefore, the vulnerability of gender to
the economic downturn is questionable, and current policies in response to the crisis were
typically based on ad-hoc or institutional considerations (Cho and Newhouse, 2013).
In this paper, I aim to analyze the overall diﬀerent eﬀects of current economic crisis
on genders in terms of labour supply outcome (i.e. unemployment rate). My study
supplements existing literature on the gender eﬀects of economic crisis in diﬀerent ways.
Firstly, it can be considered as a bridge between various strands of literature. The overall
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result from the contribution of all the possible channels through them crisis might hit
gender unevenly is measured. The fact that the crisis hit various sectors with considerably
diﬀerent level is exploited in order to use triple diﬀerence strategy to measure the extent of
the overall eﬀects. Secondly, for investigation of possible explanations all the channels and
mechanisms which have been oﬀered by preceding literature are presented and this paper
studies the gender diﬀerences in job loosing at both occupational and industrial level.
Finally, Lundberg (1985) interpretation of added worker eﬀect components is employed
in order to compare the labor supply response of a married woman at the time of crisis
and before that as one of the potential explanations.
For the purpose of this study, present economic crisis in the UK is considered. Ac-
cording to Sabarwal et al. (2010), the present economic crisis appears to be altering the
predictions and the gendered behaviors common to previous crisis as a result of the re-
cent increase in women's attachment to the workforce and the contraction of the global
demand. UK is among those countries which hit the hardest and, therefore, is a good
target for the purpose of this study. The result indicates that men are more vulnerable
to the economic crisis than female. Males occupations within the sectors that hit harder
by the crisis are more vulnerable than their females' counterparts, and ﬁndings are not
driven by household labor supply response to the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the origins of
the gender gap during the crisis. Section 3 presents the data set, while Section 4 suggests
the empirical strategies to solve the identiﬁcation problems. Section 5 presents the results,
before section 6 summarizes the ﬁndings and provides a brief conclusion.
II Why crisis might aﬀect gender diﬀerently?
The literature oﬀers several explanations for the fact that the gender response to the
economic crisis is diﬀerent.
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A Gender preferences in choosing job sectors and occupations
are diﬀerent
Gender diﬀerences in investigating on human capital explain the discrepancies across
preferences to work in a particular sector and choose particular occupation. There are
some evidences that men are over-represented in sectors vulnerable to the crisis such
as manufacturing, construction, and ﬁnancial services (Elsby et al., 2010; Elder et al.,
2010), therefore, there are more vulnerable to the reductions in employment during the
current crisis. The gender proportion diﬀerences across occupations, however, receive less
attention by scholars. As it is shown in table 2.2 and 2.10 respectively, both diﬀerences
are remarkable regarding LFS dataset.
B Firms' discriminatory behavior
The second mechanism that can explain the gender diﬀerences in response to the economic
crisis is ﬁrm discriminatory action. The theory of statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972;
Arrow, 1973) provides an explanation for ﬁrm behavior during a crisis. Based on this
theory ﬁrms as a decision-maker use observable characteristics of individual as a proxy for
unobservable, but outcome relevant, characteristics (Fang and Moro, 2010). For example,
during the crisis ﬁrms might shed female workers ﬁrst because they believe that females
are less attached to the labor market, due to child-rearing career disruptions, or because
they are less likely to be bread winners. This might make female more vulnerable to the
economic downturn in comparison with the male.
C Household labor supply decisions
According to Mincer (1962), a change in one individual's income may result in other
family members change in their labor market status If negative income eﬀect due to the
reduction in family earning power outweighs the positive substitution eﬀect the added
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worker might enter to the labor market. Lundberg (1985), demonstrates the added worker
eﬀect in terms of transition probabilities from non-participation to participation and from
unemployment to employment due to change in two reservation wages: one that controls
the participation decision and one that deﬁnes acceptable employment oﬀers. Therefore,
to understand how crisis might aﬀect household labor supply decisions one should study
both components of the added worker eﬀect. If the married women's transition from non-
participation to employment outweighs the one from non-participation to unemployment
(but participation), one could conclude that household labor supply response to the crisis
is countercyclical.
III Data and descriptive statistics
The data used are from the Labour Force Survey 1 (LFS) which is managed by the Social
and Vital Statistics division of the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) in Great Britain.
For the purpose of the main analysis of the paper the individual version of this data
set pooled over 8 years to form a no-crisis period (2004-2007) and crisis period (2008-
2011); while, the household version of LFS is utilized in order to investigate the possible
channels through which crisis might diﬀerently hit genders. Both versions of the data set
cover demographic factors as well as labor market outcome of the sample of individuals
and households. For the purpose of this study, I disregard inactive individual and the
one who are under 16 years of ages in my main analysis. Moreover, I distinguish between
the sectors that hit harder (hard_ hit from here) by the crisis and other sectors (others
from here). Figure 2.1 shows the trend in percentage growth of yearly annual value added
in industrial sectors in comparison with services for the four major European countries.
1The Labour Force Survey is a survey of households living at private addresses in the UK. Its purpose
is to provide information on the UK labour market which can then be used to develop, manage, evaluate
and report on labour market policies. The survey is managed by the Social and Vital Statistics division
of the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) in Great Britain and by the Central Survey Unit of the
Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland on behalf of the Department of Enterprise,
Trade & Investment (DETINI).
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As the graph suggests, manufacturing sectors are hit much harder by the crisis. Table
1 shows ILO unemployment rates for those sub sectors which will be considered in the
subsequent analysis 2. Columns one and three of this table illustrate ILO unemployment
rate at no-crisis time for women and men respectively and columns two and four illustrate
that, at a crisis time. The last two columns suggest overall unemployment rate across
crisis time. Table 2.1 suggests that jobs at industrial sectors are more vulnerable to the
recent economic downturn in comparison with the job at service sectors.
Table 2.2 shows unweighted descriptive statistics for a sample of individuals described
above. As one can see there are not many striking diﬀerences across the group of sectors in
term of demographic factors; however, there are diﬀerences in terms of job characteristics
(working in private or public sectors) and percentage of female that is considered and
discussed in the forthcoming analysis.
IV Identiﬁcation strategy
A DDD estimation
The goal of the empirical work is to analyze how recent economic crisis hit genders dif-
ferently. The fact that the crisis hit speciﬁc sectors the most is utilized to control for
any systematic shocks to the labor market outcomes of both genders in the hard_hit
sectors that are correlated with, but not because of the crisis. Using the strategy analogy
to "diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences" one can control for other heterogeneities.
I compare the female unemployment rate in the hard_hit sectors to a male unemploy-
ment rate in those same sectors and measure the change in the female's relative outcome,
relative to other sectors. Empirically this exercise is plausible by including year eﬀects,
to capture any trends in the earning of the female, sector eﬀects to control for secu-
2Following Bureau of Labor Statistics the previous job sectors of the people who are currently unem-
ployed considered in order to explore the unemployment by industry
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lar earning diﬀerences in the hard_hit sectors and those from other sectors, and ﬁnally
sector_by_year eﬀect, to control for sector speciﬁc shocks that are correlated with the
passage of crisis over the same period.
The identiﬁcation of this "diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences" (DDD) estima-
tor requires that there be no contemporaneous shock (rather than crisis) that aﬀects the
relative outcomes of the gender in hard_hit sectors in crisis time diﬀerently than oth-
ers. The validity of this assumption is veriﬁed by no-crisis period placebo analysis in the
following section.
The overall diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences can be written as the outcome
of two diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences (DD). The ﬁrst one indicates the unemployment rate
diﬀerences between genders in hard_hit sectors:
DDhard_hit = {E(w|group = women, yr = after} − {E(w|group = men, yr = after}
(2.1)
− {{E(w|group = wemon, yr = before} − {E(w|group = men, yr = before}}
And, the second one is the corresponding DD in other sectors:
DDother = {E(w|group = women, yr = after} − {E(w|group = men, yr = after}
(2.2)
− {{E(w|group = women, yr = before} − {E(w|group = men, yr = before}}
And, triple-diﬀerence estimator is the diﬀerence between the double diﬀerences:
DDD = DDhard_hit −DDother (2.3)
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B Regression framework for DDD estimation
Regression below is the analogy to the equation (2.3).
eijt = α + β1Xijt + β2τt + β3δj + β4genderi (2.4)
+ β5(τt ∗ δj) + β6(τt ∗ genderi) + β7(δj ∗ genderi) + β8(τt ∗ genderi ∗ δj)
The main advantages of regression framework in this context is that it ﬁrstly allows to
control for other observables that aﬀect the outcome variable of interest, and, secondly
one can easily extend the analysis to subsamples of young (age less than 25) and single.
(Gruber, 1994)
As it is explained by Gruber (1994) the analogy of this regression to equation 2.3 is
straightforward. the ﬁxed eﬀects control for the time-series changes in employment rate
(β2), the time-invariant characteristics of the hard_hit sectors (β3), and the time invariant
characteristics of the treatment group (β4). The second-level interactions control for
changes over time in the hard_hit sectors (β5), changes over time for the treatment group
sector wide (β6), and time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group in the hard_hit
sectors (β7). The third-level interaction (β8) captures all the variation in unemployment
rate speciﬁc to the treatment (relative to the control) in the hard_hit sectors (relative to
the others) in the crisis period (relative to the year prior to crisis).
V Results
A Gender gap during the downturn
Table 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate a variation in the gender gap across crisis time, in each sector
after controlling for the time trend. They suggest that, in contrast to other sectors, female
unemployment rate in comparison to male unemployment rate dropped at crisis time in
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the hard_ hit sectors with the exception of real estate. These preliminary evidences sug-
gest that the male might be more vulnerable to the current economic downturn compare
to female. Table 2.5 illustrates DDD estimation of the eﬀect of the crisis on the unem-
ployment rate by gender. The top panel compares the changes in gender unemployment
rate in hard_hit sectors across the crisis time. Each cell contains the unemployment rate
for the group labeled on the axes, along with the standard errors and the number of obser-
vations. There was a 2.6% fall in the unemployment rate of men in the hard_hit sectors
over this period, compared to a 1.3% fall in the unemployment rate of women. Thus,
there was a signiﬁcant 1.24% relative fall in the female unemployment rate in comparison
with male in the hard_hit sectors. This is the diﬀerences_in_diﬀerences estimate of the
crisis eﬀect. However, without considering the sectors that were not hit or hit with much
lower magnitude by crisis, there is a risk to lose control over any distinct labor market
shock to the hard_hit sectors over mentioned periods. Bottom panel of table 1 illustrates
the same exercise for the control group (sectors are deﬁned in table 1). For this group,
a relative fall in the unemployment rate of 0.24% was computed. The diﬀerence between
the two panels indicates that there is a 1% fall in the relative unemployment rate in the
hard_hit sectors, compared to the change in other sectors this, however, might be con-
sidered as a lower bound of the true eﬀect as other sectors hit slightly by crisis. This
statistically signiﬁcant DDD estimate provides some evidence that the crisis hit female to
a lower degree than male.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the third level interaction from regression 1 (β8).
The raw estimates of β8 are presented in columns one, three and ﬁve indicate that the
relative unemployment rates of female are dropped across all the demographic groups.
The second, fourth and sixth columns of this table present the estimates of β8 for all,
youth and the single individuals in the sample after controlling for the set of demographic
covariates including age and its squares, nationality, education, and, marital status. The
fact that introducing the other covariates did not have a sizeable impact on the coeﬃcients
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estimated in the raw speciﬁcation is comforting, given the experimental interpretation of
the estimate.
As it is discussed in chapter IV the results which are presented in table 2.6 are infor-
mative if the required identiﬁcation assumption 3 holds. The validity of such assumption
is veriﬁed in table 2.7 where it is shown that 3 years prior to crisis (years 2004 and 2005)
there were no gender diﬀerences in terms of unemployment rate in hard_hit sectors in
comparison with other sectors over time.
B Mechanisms and channels
As it is discussed in the theoretical chapter the fact that the crisis hit gender diﬀerently
can explain through three main Mechanisms: diﬀerences in gender preferences in choosing
a job; ﬁrm's discriminatory behavior; and workers' labour market behavior in response to
household income. Investigating the contribution of ﬁrm's behavior is beyond the scope
of this paper; however, analysis of the other two channels will provide some insights in
understanding the mechanisms behind the ﬁndings.
Household labour market behavior
In order to investigate workers' labor market behavior in response to household income,
I test, the "added worker eﬀect" hypotheses following Lundberg (1985) classiﬁcation of
the added worker eﬀect components. As it is stated in the theoretical chapter in order to
understand how crisis might aﬀect household labor supply decisions, one should consider
wives transition from non-participation to participation as well as from unemployment to
employment. Only if the transition from non-participation to employment outweighs the
one from non-participation to unemployment the household labor supply behavior during
the crisis is countercyclical.
3that there is no contemporaneous shock (rather than crisis) that aﬀects the relative outcomes of the
treatment group (women in hard_hit sectors after crisis) diﬀerently than others.
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The cross-tabulation in table 2.8 reveals that married women are less likely to be
employed in the labor force when their husbands are unemployed both at the crisis time
and before that.
Table 2.9 illustrates the linear probability model for both types of transitions. The
dependent variables in column one and column two are dichotomous variables taking the
value of 1 if the wife is employed and if she is in labor force participation respectively.
The ﬁndings suggest that at the crisis time the probability of wife participation is 3.8 per-
cent more, however, this does not contribute to their employment rate as the interaction
variable (interaction between two indicator variables crisis and husband unemployment)
in column one is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, one cannot conclude that the
household labor supply behavior during the crisis is countercyclical.
Gender occupations within industry
Table 2.10 indicates the proportion of male and female in each major occupation groups
across crisis period for "hard_hit" versus "others" sectors. The major occupations are
divided to 9 from managers and senior level to elementary ones. There are fundamental
diﬀerences between the distributions of occupation across genders in hard_hit sectors in
comparison with other sectors. This table suggests that the proportion of male work-
ers within hard_hit sectors are far more than female ones in the both extreme part of
occupational distribution.
Table 2.11 shows the estimation of coeﬃcient β8 from estimating equation 2.4 within
each major occupation group. The ﬁndings suggest that the crisis might hit lowest part
of occupation distribution the most and previous results is mostly driven from the lowest
occupational category.
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VI Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects of current economic crisis on the unemployment
rate of men and women for the sample of working age group in the UK. Using triple
diﬀerence technique by considering the fact that sectors are hit diﬀerently by crisis, I
compare the female unemployment rate in the sectors which are hit harder with the
male unemployment rate in those same sectors. This helps measuring changes in the
female's outcome relative to other sectors. This unique set up allows controlling for
any heterogeneity that may aﬀect the results other than economic crisis. The evidences
provided in this paper suggest that men are more vulnerable to the crisis when comparet
to women.
Furthermore, examining the explanations provided in literature, this paper studies the
mechanisms through which economic crisis might aﬀect genders diﬀerently with respect to
labor market outcome. Findings suggest that men occupy the most vulnerable occupations
within the sectors which are hit hardest by the crisis and that family supply response to
the crisis does not explain the ﬁndings.
My study suggests that appropriate labor market policy during the crisis should target
the individuals (mostly males) who occupy the lowest level occupation in the sectors that
hit hardest by the crisis.
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VII Tables chapter 2
Table 2.1: Industrial unemployment rate by gender.
Women Men All
No Crisis Crisis No Crisis Crisis No Crisis Crisis
A: Industry
Manufacturing 4.2 5.2 4.3 6.5 4.3 6.2
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0) (0) (0)
[32712] [24720] [91454] [70312] [124166] [95032]
Construction 2.4 4.2 3.7 7.8 3.6 7.4
(0.001) (0.002) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.001)
[7782] [6835] [66521] [58935] [74303] [65770]
Real estate 3.3 4.8 3.4 5.1 3.36 5
(0) (0.001) (0) (0) (0) (0)
[45254] [44099] [59943] [60481] [105197] [104580]
B: Services
Public administrate 1.55 2.67 1.84 2.1 1.7 2.4
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
[33574] [29109] [31806] [27842] [65380] [56951]
Education 1.67 2.37 2.07 2.87 1.77 2.5
(0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0) (0)
[63345] [62142] [22599] [21750] [85944] [83892]
Health&social work 2.1 2.68 2.4 3.3 2.16 2.81
(0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.) (0)
[93616] [89960] [22454] [22806] [116070] [112766]
Notes. Cells contain ILO unemployment rate of those previously employed in the industry for the group identiﬁed.
Standard errors are given in parentfeses; sample sizes are given in square brackets. crisis periods are deﬁned in
the text.
50 CHAPTER 2. VULNERABILITY TO ECONOMIC CRISIS
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Hard_hit Other
sectors sectors
After Before After Before
(1) Female 0.32 0.32 0.72 0.72
(0.47) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45)
(2) British 0.41 0.39 0.46 0.42
(0.49) (0.49) (0.5) (0.49)
(3) Age 41.8 40.8 43.5 42.8
(12.3) (12.1) (11.6) (11.3)
(4) Public 0.036 0.035 0.69 0.72
(0.46) (0.44) (0.19) (0.18)
(5) Full time 0.86 0.87 0.66 0.66
(0.34) (0.33) (0.47) (0.47)
(6) Single 0.273 .0278 0.272 0.267
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
(7) Log hourpay 2.46 2.33 2.4 2.3
(0.58) (0.57) (0.53) (0.53)
Number of observations 70429 66607 75940 75827
Notes. Cells contain proportion of the observations for the each group. Standard errors are given
in parentfeses. Years before/after crisis, and hard hit/other sectors, are deﬁned in the text.
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Table 2.3: Regression analysis unemployment rate by sectors (hard_hit)
A: Manufacturing
Crisis 0.02**
(0.002)
gender -0.0012
(0.001)
Interaction* -0.011**
(0.003)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 219198
Pseudo R_Squared 0.002
B: Construction
Crisis 0.041**
(0.002)
gender -0.013**
(0.002)
Interaction -0.023**
(0.003)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 140073
Pseudo R_Squared 0.009
C: Real state
Crisis 0.021**
(0.002)
gender -0.0008
(0.001)
Interaction -0.002
(0.002)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 209777
Pseudo R_Squared 0.003
Notes. Dependant variable is a dummy
variable for being in employment.
* "Interaction" is the interaction be-
tween variables Crisis and Gender
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Table 2.4: Regression analysis unemployment rate by sectors (others)
A: Public Administration
Crisis 0.017**
(0.002)
gender -0.003**
(0.001)
Interaction -0.002
(0.002)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 122331
Pseudo R_Squared 0.001
B: Education
Crisis 0.014**
(0.002)
gender -0.004**
(0.001)
Interaction -0.0009
(0.001)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 169836
Pseudo R_Squared 0.0012
C: Health
Crisis 0.015
(0.002)
gender -0.003
(0.001)
Interaction -0.003*
(0.0017)
Controls
Time trend yes
Number of observations 228836
Pseudo R_Squared 0.001
Notes. Dependant variable is a dummy
variable for being in employment.
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Table 2.5: DDD estimates of the impact of crisis on unemployment rate
Before crisis After crisis Time diﬀerence
for gender
A: Hard_hit sectors
Male 0.039 0.065 -0.026
(0) (0) (0)
[217918] [189728]
Female 0.036 0.049 -0.013
(0) (0) (0)
[85748] [75654]
Gender diﬀerences at a point in time 0.0032 0.015
(0.0007) (0.001)
Dif_in_Dif -0.0124
(0.001)
B: Other sectors
Male 0.021 0.029 -0.0087
(0) (0) (0)
[76859] [72398]
Female 0.019 0.025 -0.0063
(0) (0) (0)
[190535] [181211]
Gender diﬀerences at a point in time 0.002 0.0044
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Dif_in_Dif -0.0024
(0.0009)
DDD -0.01
(0.001)
Notes. Cells contain unemployment rate for the group identiﬁed. Standard errors are given
in parentfeses; sample sizes are given in square brackets. Years before/after crisis, and hard
hit/other sectors, are deﬁned in the text. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀeren(DDD) is the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in the upper panel minus that in the lower panel.
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Table 2.6: DDD estimates across demographic groups
All Youth Single
1 2 3 4 5 6
β8 (DDD) -0.01** -0.008** -0.025** -0.021** -0.028** -0.022**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Female -0.002** -0.005** -0.017** -0.015** -0.017** -0.018**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Crisis 0.009** 0.009** 0.016** 0.019** 0.01** 0.014**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Sector 0.018** 0.008** 0.029** 0.012** 0.03** 0.014**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female*sector -0.001 0.002** 0.003 0.014** -0.005** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Female*crisis -0.002** -0.002** -0.0008 0.001** 0.002 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Sector*crisis 0.017** 0.017** 0.024** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
Observations 1090051 892033 107707 88476 308634 253566
R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0
Notes. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Controls are demographic factors including age and age2 as a proxy
for experiences, education which is the highest level of education each individual obtained, whether they are British
and single.
Table 2.7: Placebo Analysis 2004-2005
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Youth single
DDD -0.002 -0.002 0
(0.003) (0.01) (0.006)
Observations 289122 30700 79203
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.008
Notes. Cells contain unemployment rate for
the group identiﬁed. Standard errors are given
in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Added worker eﬀect comparison across crisis period
No Crisis Crisis
2006-2007 2008-2009
Employment Unemployment Inactive Employment Unemployment Inactive
% % % % % %
All Wives 55.83 1.43 42.39 55.39 1.5 43.11
Husband employed 63.44 1.57 34.56 62.95 1.60 35.45
H unemployed 55.67 1.56 42.09 55.82 1.49 42.70
H not participate 46.16 1.21 52.1 46.3 1.1 52.6
Table 2.9: Added worker eﬀect regression analysis
Dependant variable Dependent variable
Wife employment Wife participation
Husband unemployed -0.09** -0.09**
(0.01) (0.01)
Crisis -0.002** -0.028**
(0.001) (0.002)
Interaction* 0.018 0.038**
(0.014) (0.017)
Controls
British 0.002** 0.01
(0.001) (0.002)
Age 0.0005** -0.006**
(0) (0)
Num children under 4 -0.0003 -0.13**
(0.001) (0.003)
Num dependent children -0-004** -0.03**
(0.0006) (0.001)
Ethnicity yes yes
Highest Education yes yes
Number of observations 88393 108048
Pseudo R_Squared 0.02 0.08
Notes. the table shows the linear probability model on the labor supply prob-
ability of women.
* "Interaction" is the interaction between variables Crisis and Husband unem-
ployed.
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Table 2.10: Distribution of occupations by gender before and after crisis
No Crisis Crisis
2004-2007 2008-2011
Male female Male Female
% % % %
A: Hard hit
Managers and Senior Oﬃcials 74.73 25.27 73.26 26.74
Professional occupations 80.72 19.28 79.69 20.31
Associate Professional and Technical 61.69 38.31 60.38 39.62
Administrative and Secretarial 17.12 82.88 16.88 83.12
Skilled Trades Occupations 96.45 3.55 96.60 3.40
Personal Service Occupations 39.2 60.8 43.99 56.01
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 37.74 62.26 39 61
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 80.75 19.25 83 17
Elementary Occupations 70.40 29.60 67.65 32.35
B: Others
Managers and Senior Oﬃcials 43.15 56.85 41.98 58.02
Professional occupations 37.79 62.21 36.18 63.82
Associate Professional and Technical 35.42 64.58 34.36 65.64
Administrative and Secretarial 17.04 82.96 18.08 81.92
Skilled Trades Occupations 60.24 39.76 62.27 37.73
Personal Service Occupations 11.34 88.66 12.35 87.65
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 20.99 79.01 25.47 74.53
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 78.92 21.08 79.1 20.9
Elementary Occupations 23.15 76.85 25.75 74.25
Table 2.11: DDD estimates by oocupational groups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
β8 (DDD) 0.002** 0.008 0.0015 -0.004 -0.046** 0.026 0.029 -0.02 -0.06**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014) (0.008)
Observations 126697 175282 160448 124059 119332 102593 14738 64118 86429
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.015 0.012 0.03
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Figure 2.1: Industry vs. Services - Annual % growth of value added
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Note. Each graph shows the Annual % growth of Value Added for services (red line) and manufac-
turing (blue line) in diﬀerent countries. Source: World Bank.
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Chapter 3
Gender Gap in Scholastic Outcome
ABSTRACT
The existence, origin and degree of gender gap has been the matter of concern in
academic debates. This paper analysed the emergence of a gender gap in "mathematics"
and "reading" test scores among second, ﬁfth and sixth Italian graders. I use INVALSI
dataset for the universe of Italian primary and secondary school in the academic year
2009-10. The ﬁndings suggest that girls loose the ground to boys in mathematics but not
in reading, and that the variability is stronger among boys when compared to that among
girls. Boys predominate in three of the four extreme scoring categories (low reading,
low mathematics and high mathematics) while girls predominate in high reading. A
wide range of possible explanations are explored including social diﬀerences (low parental
expectation, provincial diﬀerences in culture and social capital) and innate diﬀerences
(diﬀerence in reaction to school resources as a proxy for innate diﬀerences). However,
little evidence is found to support any of these arguments.
Keywords: Gender gap, Education, INVALSI.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: I21, J16.
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I Introduction
The fact that genders are diﬀerent in schooling achievements in terms of average perfor-
mance and variability around the average have raised considerable debate. researchers
study the mean diﬀerences, in educational outcome, suggest that boys outperform girls
in mathematics, while, girls are dominant in languages (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008;
Guiso et al., 2008; Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2009). Their ﬁndings are more striking when one
considers that female systematically outperform males on many other educational dimen-
sions. The variability diﬀerences across genders, however, attracted less consideration
even if the idea that males are intellectually and educationally more variable than females
dates back to late 19th century texts from Ellis (1894) and Galton (1952). (Machin and
Pekkarinen, 2008). The recent example for the concept that there are always more males
at the upper end of the distributions of educational and professional success is that there
being more male than female Nobel Prize winners (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008)
Some recent studies focus on the origins of the gender gap. One strand of the litera-
ture investigates the biological diﬀerences between the two genders. They consider brain
composition diﬀerences (Cahill, 2005; Gallagher and Kaufman, 2005), diﬀerence in hor-
mone levels (Davison and Susman, 2001) and, diﬀerences in spatial ability (Lawton and
Hatcher, 2005). The other strand, however, emphasize on societal factors by investigating
the diﬀerences in the level of competitivity (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2004; Gneezy et al., 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010) in the parental expec-
tation (Eccles and Jacobs, 1986; Bhanot and Jovanovic, 2005; Bouﬀard and Hill, 2005;
Muller, 1998; Parsons et al., 1982), deferential treatment by teachers (Dee, 2005) and
stereotype threat (O'Brien and Crandall, 2003; Spencer et al., 1999; Brown and Josephs,
1999). Empirical evidences suggest that the determinants of the gender achievement gaps
have not yet been very well understood, and there is scope for further research.
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In this paper, the INVALSI 1 data set is utilized to document the gender gap in
terms of mean and variability among Italian second, ﬁfth and sixth graders. The origin
of the gap is investigated by examining some of the societal forces (i.e. the parental
expectation, provincial diﬀerences in social capital, cultural diﬀerences between natives'
and immigrants' pupils) and innate diﬀerences which is proxied by gender gap in reaction
to change in school resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2, presents the existence of the
gender gap in Italy. Section 3, presents the potential origin of this gap and ﬁnally, Section
4, summarizes the ﬁndings and provide the conclusion.
II Gender gap in Italy
A Data
The primary dataset used in this paper is the Istituto Nazionale per la Valutazione del
Sistema Dell'Istruzione (INVALSI). INVALSI is the National Institute for the Evaluation
of the Education System which is in charge of design and administration of standardized
education tests in Italy. The tests have been administered every year since 2008. The
recent waves of INVALSI collect data for the entire population of Italian primary students
(second and ﬁfth graders), and lower secondary ones. For each student in grades 2, 5 and
6 the dataset contains information on class size and grade in the school, immigrant status
based on citizenship and language spoken at home, test scores in reading and mathematics,
sex, age and family background information. Performance in reading and mathematics
test is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
Table 3.1 illustrates summary statistics for the variables in the core speciﬁcation of
the paper. Students who are missing data in test scores or gender are dropped from the
1 INVALSI is the National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System, in charge of design
and administration of standardized education tests in Italy
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sample. The primary outcome variables are standardized test scores in mathematics and
reading. Both mathematics and reading test are evaluated based on the fraction of correct
answers. As one can see from this table, female students are outperformed by males in
mathematics, in both second and ﬁfth grades, and the gap between them is enlarging
over time. However, in reading females performance are better than males. Regarding
demographic variables (e.g. socio-economic status of the family, whether parents are
highly educated or skilled), mean diﬀerences across genders are small because children's
gender is approximately randomly assigned across households.
B Mean diﬀerences
Research studies compromised the diﬀerences across genders in terms of average mathe-
matics and reading test score (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008b; Fryer Jr
and Levitt, 2009). Findings across Italian graders are similar. Table 3.2 presents the
gender gap in mathematics and reading for second Italian graders. Gender gap is mea-
sured in total as well as by geographical areas across northern, center and southern part
of Italy. Evidences suggest that on average boys, score approximately 0.01 points more
than girls in mathematics, yielding a trivial achievement gap in favor of boys. In reading,
girls start 0.028 points ahead of boys. Regional analysis suggests that the gender gap
in mathematics be surprisingly higher in north and center when compared to the south.
However, there is no gap in reading test score.
The gender gaps in mathematics, and reading test score for ﬁfth graders are displayed
in table 3.3. The ﬁfth graders' male students score 0.025 points in average more than
female students in mathematics, which is noticeably higher than the gap when compared
to the second grade.
Table 3.4 and 3.5 present a series of the estimation of the gender gap for the second
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and ﬁfth graders. The estimated equations are of the following form:
yi = α + βGenderi + γxi +  (3.1)
Where, i indexes students and Gender is an indicator variable. In the most fully pa-
rameterized models, the vector of other covariates denoted xi are includes. The estimates
are done using ordinary least square.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 3.4 and 3.5 report the raw gender gap for the second
and ﬁfth graders in mathematics and reading respectively. These numbers parallel those
found in tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. As mentioned earlier, the gender gap in mathematics
is statistically diﬀerent from zero and by the end of the ﬁfth grade the gap increases to
0.024 standard deviation and is marginally signiﬁcant.
The gender gaps change little when the covariates are added. As it is shown in the
last two columns of table 3.4 the magnitude of the gender gap after controlling for other
factors is slightly larger than the raw gap in mathematics. The magnitude and sign of
the other covariates appear plausible. First and second generations of immigrant students
perform signiﬁcantly worse than Italian; second generation, however, do better than the
ﬁrst generation. Furthermore, children with lower family background do worth than their
counterparts.
Table 3.5 provides a parallel analysis on reading achievement. Female students are
performing better in reading, and these diﬀerences persist over time and after controlling
for the set of controls. As it was the case for mathematics analysis, the inclusion of
the controls slightly improve the performance of boys relative to that of girls, and the
magnitude and sign of the other covariates are in line with the expectation.
64 CHAPTER 3. GENDER GAP IN SCHOLASTIC OUTCOME
C Variability diﬀerences
The other interesting phenomenon which is highly debated in the literature (Machin and
Pekkarinen, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008a; Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2009), is the scores variabil-
ity diﬀerences between girls and boys. If girls were equally represented throughout the
achievement distribution, one would expect any cut of the distribution to have the boys to
girls' ratio of approximately 1.016 which is the corresponding ratio for the second graders
in the overall population.
The last three rows of table 3.2 display the ratio of boys to girls for the second graders
in diﬀerent parts of the raw test score distribution over various geographical areas in Italy
(i.e. South, Centre, and North). The variance ratio of boys to girls in mathematics test
score is signiﬁcantly more than one in all the areas with the exception of south, where,
the variance ratio is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. The ratio of boys to girls in the
top and bottom ten percent of the distribution in mathematics is in favor of the boys.
Considering reading test scores, the overall variance ratio has remained in favor of boys
regardless of the regions they are living in. However, The ratio of boys to girls in the top
ten percent is in favor of the girls.
The last three rows of table 3.3 report the variance ratio, top and bottom ten percent
of mathematics and reading distribution for the ﬁfth Italian graders. The trend is the
same when compared to the second graders with the higher magnitude in mathematics,
and, the lower one for reading test scores. Moreover, the ratio of the boys to girls in the
top 10 percent of a mathematics distribution are more for the ﬁfth graders when compared
to the second graders. This suggests that gender gap is increasing notably in mathematics
while decreasing in reading when children become older. In both grades Boys predominate
in three of the four extreme scoring categories (low reading, low mathematics, and high
mathematics), while, girls predominate in top reading category.
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III Origins of the gender gap
This section examines some of the potential driving forces of gender diﬀerences in ed-
ucational outcomes. The two main categories in explaining this phenomena are social
environment and biological diﬀerences (innate diﬀerences). Diﬀerences in the social con-
ditions across genders can be determined by the diﬀerences in the stereotype threat,
parental expectation, cultural and social capital and teacher treatment. In this chapter
diﬀerences in parental expectations and diﬀerences in social capital across Italian regions
are examined as a proxy for social environment. However, biological diﬀerences can be
measured by the factors such as brain composition, hormone levels and spatial ability.
Investigating the biological diﬀerences is beyond the scope of this paper, since the dataset
provides no information related to biological factors. However, reaction of the gender to
the changes in the class resources (i.e. class size) assumed to be a potential measure for
innate gender diﬀerences under certain conditions ( for example if gender peer eﬀect is
constant across classes with diﬀerent sizes).
A Parental expectation and stereotype threat
The negative stereotype that women are weaker in mathematics performance may cause
an apprehension that disrupts women's mathematics performance (Spencer et al., 1999).
Parents' math-related gender stereotypes (e.g. if daughters' parents thought their child
had to work harder to do well in math in comparison with their son) might create a
wide range of stereotype threat that might aﬀect girls' math ability perceptions and her
conﬁdence. Therefore, children's attitude may be inﬂuenced by their parent's attitudes
about their abilities. According to Jacob 1986, parental expectation and beliefs are formed
children's perception of their parents' beliefs and that altered children's self conﬁdence
which might have a greater inﬂuence on students' attitudes when compared to their past
performances. Following (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2009) I assume that lack of impact on
66 CHAPTER 3. GENDER GAP IN SCHOLASTIC OUTCOME
parental expectations is consistent with the absence of an impact of being in a family where
the mother has more education than the father. Moreover, the gender gap between families
whose father has more education than the mother as well as the one that both parents
are highly educated in comparison with the one who are not educated are examined. To
do this analysis, equations of the following form are estimated:
yisc = αics+Genderiscβ+motherdominationiscγ+Genderics∗motherdominationicsδ+isc
(3.2)
Where yisc is pupil is score, Gender is dummy variable equal to one if is girl, mother-
domination is dummy variable equal to one if mother is dominating father in terms of
education and δ is a coeﬃcient of primary interest capturing the gender diﬀerences in
mother's dominated families in comparison with other families.  is error component
speciﬁc to pupils.
The evidences in tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 do not support the idea that parental
expectation might inﬂuence children's performance in mathematics.
As parental expectation and beliefs might be inﬂuenced by media, the gender gap in
the families with the high number of books at home when compared to other families is
investigated. Therefore, the higher number of books at home is taken as a proxy for not
being exposed to media, or less aﬀected by them. However, the ﬁndings in table 3.14
suggest that there be no signiﬁcant diﬀerences among those diﬀerent kinds of families.
B Social capital, culture and gender diﬀerences
Studies suggest that in countries with more gender equal culture, the gender gap that
is usually in favor of boys, in average mathematics and reading test scores, is erased
or even reversed in favor of girls (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008). Considering gender
equality perception as a good value, one of the mechanisms through which social capital
might aﬀect the gender gap is by enhancing the prevailing level of good values in children.
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Cultural transmission of value cooperation modeled by Tabellini (2008) based on the
previous work on value transmission framework by (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Bisin
et al., 2004), shows that parents optimize the level of the values they choose to pass
onto their children. Based on Tabellini's model the payoﬀ from cooperation increases
when more people cooperate, and this expands the scope of cooperation. Therefore, an
expansion in the scope of cooperation makes it easier for the parents to transmit good
values to their children.
In this section the link between the level of social capital which is deﬁned as a good
culture 2 (Guiso et al., 2008a) in provincial level in Italy and the size of the gender gap
is examined to see whether the provincial diﬀerences in the size of the gender gap are
associated to the diﬀerences in the level of social capital each region endowed with.
To investigate the eﬀect of social capital on the gender gap two diﬀerent methods
are utilized. The ﬁrst method uses the measures of social capital which are deﬁned
by Guiso et al. (2008). In their seminal paper the causal eﬀect of social capital on
ﬁnancial development is investigated by determining two measures for social capital at
the provincial level. The ﬁrst one is the number of blood donations per million inhabitants
in 1995 and the second one is the average electoral participation in the referenda held in
Italy between 1946 and 1987. In the second method, the gender gap among natives is
compared with the one among diﬀerent generations of immigrants in Italy. In the ﬁrst
method, the gender gap in mathematics and reading are interacted with the two measures
of social capital to examine the diﬀerences in the gender gap between regions with a higher
level of social capital when compared to others. As social capital is strongly correlated
with local economic conditions I also control for provincial GDP per capita. To do this
2In Guiso et al. (2008a) social capital is deﬁned as âgoodâ culture, which means a set of beliefs
and values that facilitate cooperation among the members of a community
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analysis equations of the following form are estimated:
yisc = αics +Genderiscβ + socialcapitalpγ +Genderics ∗ socialcapitalpδ + isc (3.3)
Where yisc is pupil i's score in logarithm form, Gender is dummy variable equal to one
if is girl, socialcapitalp is measured by two diﬀerent indices as I explained above and p
denotes province, δ is a coeﬃcient allowing for the return to social capital to be diﬀerent
among genders.  is error component.
Table 3.11 shows the result for the second graders' mathematics score. Considering
turnover at referenda as a proxy for social capital (column 3 and 5) return to social capitals
are economically and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for boys and girls. Social capital is
highly correlated with provincial GDP, thereby potential omitted variable bias that might
arise if a gender gap diﬀer systematically by provincial economic conditions is addressed
by controlling for the GDP per province (Columns 4 and 5). However, controlling for
provincial economic condition make no diﬀerences in to the estimated coeﬃcient on the
gender gap relative to raw estimation (columns 2 and 3). The estimated score return
on social capital in the ﬁfth speciﬁcation (column 5) is -40.7 % for each extra percentage
voter turnout at referenda for boys (as a measure for social capital) and -49 % (=-0.407+(-
0.083)), in percent) for girls. Since, the regression function for boys and girls have diﬀerent
slope, the gender gap depends on the voter turnout for the referenda at the province level.
For 0.8 percent turnout at referenda the gender gap is estimated to be -0.0154 % (=-0.083
* 0.8 + 0.051); for 0.85 percent turnout, the gender gap is more in percentage terms,
-0.0195 %.
Table 3.12 shows the result for the second graders' reading score. Return to social
capitals are economically and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for boys and girls in the
90 percent interval if social capital is proxied by turnover at referenda (columns3 and
5). Controlling for the GDP per province to address potential omitted variable bias
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does not change estimated coeﬃcients. The estimated score return on social capital is
-12.5 % for each extra percentage voter turnout at referenda for boys (as a measure for
social capital) and -8.6% (= -0.125+ 0.039), in percent) for girls (based on ﬁfth regression
speciﬁcation). Since, the regression function for boys and girls have diﬀerent slope, the
gender gap depends on the voter turnout for the referenda at the province level. For 0.8
percent turnout at referenda the gender gap is estimated to be 0.052 % (= 0.039* 0.8 +
0.022); for 85 % percent turnout, the gender gap is more in percentage terms, 0.055 %.
The results for the ﬁfth graders are consistent with the one for the second graders but
the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are bigger in the latter one.
The second approach is based on the fact that, the behaviors of the movers is aﬀected
by the level of social capital of the province (country) where they were born (Guiso et al.,
2008). Based on this approach, if social capital are matter, the social capital and cultural
diﬀerences between natives and immigrants might lead to the diﬀerences in the gender
gap among two cohorts.
The ﬁndings in table 3.14 suggests that for the second graders there are no diﬀerences
in the gender gap between ﬁrst generation immigrants and native Italians. However, the
gender gap between the two groups is statistically signiﬁcant in their ﬁfth grades. The
coeﬃcient in reading test score is in line with the expectations and the gap in gender
gap is more among immigrants than natives. However, the result is reverse considering
mathematics score, where, surprisingly the gender gap is less for immigrants.
Based on the results for the second generation of immigrants which is shown in table
3.15 there are no evidences on the gap in gender gap between natives and immigrants
with the exception of reading test score for the second graders that is in the expected
direction.
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C Gender diﬀerences in response to the class size eﬀect
This chapter examines the gender diﬀerences in response to the changes in school resources
(i.e. class size). I assume that, under certain assumptions (e.g. changes in peer eﬀect is
the same for both genders across classes of diﬀerent size), gender diﬀerences in response
to the class size cannot be explained by any societal factors, therefore; it might be a proxy
for genders' innate diﬀerences.
Following Angrist and Lavy (1999), I exploit Maimonides 3 rule that can be used to
evaluate the eﬀect of the class size on the performance of Italian pupils based on their
genders by providing a potentially exogenous source of variation in class size.
Based on Italian law, class size cannot be larger than 25 with a margin of ﬂexibility
of +10 percent, and it cannot be smaller than 10 with a margin of ﬂexibility of -10%
(Ballatore et al., 2012). Therefore, class size increases with enrollment until 25 pupils are
enrolled, when another extra student is enrolled, there will be a sharp drop in class size,
to an average of 13 pupils. Similarly, when 50 pupils are enrolled, the average class size
become 25 students per class, but when 51 are enrolled the average class sizes drop to
25,5.
Let Z be the total enrollment in a school and C the number of classes, the rule for
class size disregarding the margins of ﬂexibility is:
S¯ =
Z
Int(Z−1
25
) + 1
(3.4)
Where lnt(x) is the largest integer smaller or equal to x. Based on equation (3.4) theoreti-
cal class size is a function of school enrollment that displays discontinuities at multiples of
25. The predicted and actual class size in Italian elementary and early secondary schools
3Twelfth century Rabbinic scholar who ﬁrst interprets the Talmud's (who discuss rules for the determi-
nation of class size and pupil teacher ratio in bible around the beginning of the sixth century) discussion
of class size: one teacher might assign to the class with up to twenty ﬁve students; an assistant should
add to a class of twenty ﬁve to forty students and if there are more than forty students two teacher must
be appointed.
III. ORIGINS OF THE GENDER GAP 71
are plotted in ﬁgure 3.1 (Ballatore et al., 2012).
Figure 3.1: Predicted and actual class size in Italy
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Figure 3.1 plots the average class size by enrollment size for second, ﬁfth and sixth
grade pupils along with the predicted class size. It is shown that, at enrollment levels that
are not integers multiples of 25, class size increases approximately linearly with enrollment
size. But average class size drops sharply at integers multiples of 25. Therefore, on the left
of each threshold theoretical class size is larger than on the right, and this feature of the
rule oﬀers a source of variation for class size. For the relative analysis the ﬁrst threshold
(enrollment from 10 to 40) is considered, Since, this threshold is more compatible with
class size rule.
Table 3.17 reports descriptive statistics, including average class size, enrollment, test
scores and average of the number of girls and boys in classes in the entire population as
well as in the discontinuity sample (ﬁrst threshold: enrollment between 10 to 40). As it
is shown in panel A of the table, the average elementary school's class in the data set has
about 20 pupils, and there are nearly 117 pupils per grade.
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Panel B of the table shows descriptive statistics for the discontinuity sample deﬁned
to include only schools with enrollments in the set of interval 10 to 40. As it is shown in
the table, slightly more than one-quarter of classes come from schools with enrollments
in this range. Average class size is marginally smaller in this discontinuity sample when
compared to the overall population. And, the average characteristics of classes in the
discontinuity sample (e.g. test scores) are slightly higher when compared to the average
in the population.
Figure 3.2 shows the change in class size by enrollment for the ﬁrst threshold for each
gender. Enrollment between 26 to 28 is dropped from the analysis to respect the margin
of ﬂexibility in class size rule. As one can see from this ﬁgure, there is a jump in real class
size when enrollment passes the threshold.
In addition to exhibiting a strong compliance with the class size rule, the real class
size is expected to be correlated with the average test scores of second and ﬁfth graders.
This can be seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 which plot average scores and average values of
class size by enrollment size in enrollment intervals of 10. The ﬁgures show that average
mathematics scores by enrollment exhibit an up-and-down pattern that is the mirror
image of the class size rule. However, the pattern is not as clear in reading scores.
The ﬁgures suggest a link between the variation in the class size induced by Mai-
monides' rule and pupil achievements for both genders, but they do not provide a frame-
work for formal statistical inference. Therefore, a model for individual pupils test scores
is used to describe the causal relationship between class size and performance for each
gender and to verify whether there is any diﬀerence in the gender reaction to class size.
For the ith student in class c and school s,the following equation is estimated:
yisc = Xsβ +Genderiscα + Lowsizescγ +Gender ∗ Lowsizeicsδ + isc (3.5)
Where yisc is pupil is score, Xs is a vector of school characteristics including functions
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of enrollment, Gender is dummy variable equal to one if is the girl, Lowsize is dummy
variable equal to one if enrollment is more than 28 and δ is a coeﬃcient of primary interest
capturing the gender diﬀerences in response to class size.  is error component speciﬁc
to pupils. Applying Campbell (1969) 4 suggestion to the class size equation ﬁrst used
by Angrist and Lavy (1999), I identify the causal eﬀect of class size on test scores for
each gender in Italian school by using discontinuities or nonlinearities in the relationship
between enrollment and class size for each gender. Following Angrist and Lavy (1999) I
control for confounding factors by adding smooth functions of enrollment in the vector of
covariates.
The identifying assumptions behind this approach are as following:
• Continuity assumption at the threshold for both kinds of schools must hold. This
means, the smooth functions included in the equation must capture all the potential
relation between nonclass-size eﬀects on test scores and enrollment. Like all the
other identiﬁcation assumption, this assumption is not directly testable.
• Parents do not exploit the class size rule to send their children to the schools with
small classes. According to Italian law transferring children from one school to
another one is solely possible if parents move from one place to another, therefore,
this assumption is plausible.
The evidences in table 3.17 suggest that the identiﬁcation assumptions are indeed
plausible, for instance, the classes before and after the threshold have the same charac-
teristics in terms of share of pupils with uneducated parents in the class. Table 3.18 and
3.19 illustrates the ﬁndings for the second and ﬁfth graders respectively. The results are
partially in line with what have been observed by the ﬁgures. However, there are no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between genders in response to the class size eﬀect.
4In his seminal paper "Nonexperimental methods, in evaluation research" he discussed, how to identify
the causal eﬀect of treatment that is assigned as a deterministic function of the observed covariate that
is also related to the outcome of interest
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IV Conclusion
In this paper, I employ a nationally representative data set for Italian second, ﬁfth and
sixth graders in order to document and analyse the emergence of the gender gap in
mathematics and reading. Consistent with the ﬁndings of current studies, I illustrate that
genders are indeed diﬀerent in their average achievement in mathematics and reading and
the variability around the average, and, the diﬀerences are sharper when they become
older (second grade compared to the ﬁfth one). Moreover, ﬁndings illustrate that boys
predominate girls in three extreme categories of mathematics and reading distribution:
low reading, low mathematics, and high mathematics. The origins of the gender gap
are investigated by exploring the wide range of possible explanations, including parental
expectation, social capital and cultural diﬀerences, as well as responses to class size eﬀect
as a potential measure for innate gender diﬀerences. However little supports for any of
those arguments were found.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics by gender
Variable Male Female Diﬀerence Mean Diﬀerence
Signiﬁcant
Mathematics test score
Grade 2 0.627 0.617 0.009 **
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Grade 5 0.662 0.637 0.247 **
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Reading test score
Grade 2 0.643 0.671 -0.027 **
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Grade 5 0.694 0.708 -0.013 **
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Grade 6 0.607 0.6228 -0.0148 **
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Gender proportions 0.48 0.46 0.022 **
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Italian ratio 0.43 0.41 0.018 **
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
1st immigrant generation 0.025 0.022 0.002 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
2nd immigrant generation 0.21 0,19 0.001 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00017)
Low educated share of parents 0.134 0.13 0.004 **
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Low skilled share of parents 0.037 0.035 0.001 **
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Frequency of Missing Values:
Citizenship 0.0027 0.0027 0
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00008)
Parents skills 0.016 0.015 0.001 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of Observations 683730 652188
Source: Invalsi data for academic years 2009-10 and 2010-2011. Performance in a test is
measured as the fraction of correct answers.
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Table 3.2: Gender Gap in Italy-Grade 2
Itally North Center South
Mathematics
Mean M_F gap .0094** .014** .013** .0024*
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001)
M_F Variance Ratio 1.017** 1.065** 1.031** 0.99
M_F Ratio in top 10% 1.11 1.36 1.17 1.02
M_F Ratio in bottom 10% 1.33 1.13 1.24 1.57
Reading
Mean M_F gap -.027** -.029** -.027** -.025**
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.0016) (0.0012)
M_F Variance Ratio 1.056** 1.053** 1.069** 1.054**
M_F Ratio in top 10% 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.89
M_F Ratio in bottom 10% 1.35 1.4 1.49 1.27
Notes. Signiﬁcance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3.3: Gender gap in Italy-Grade 5
Itally North Center South
Mathematics
Mean M_F gap .025** .033** .033** .009**
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001)
M_F Variance Ratio 1.041** 1.113** 1.058** 1
M_F Ratio in top 10% 1.33 1.73 1.5 1.06
M_F Ratio in bottom 10% 1.25 1.17 1.06 1.40
Reading
Mean M_F gap -.013** -.016** -.009** -.012**
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001)
M_F Variance Ratio 1.03** 1.055** 1.024** 1.014*
M_F Ratio in top 10% 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.9
M_F Ratio in bottom 10% 1.13 1.06 1.27 1.20
Notes. Signiﬁcance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 3.4: Estimation of gender gap in mathematics
Grade2 Grade5 Grade2 Grade5
(1) Female -0.009*** -0.024*** -0.01*** -0.026***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
(2) ForeignI -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.002) (0.002)
(3) ForeignII -0.077*** -0.06***
(0.001) (0.002)
Controls
(4) Low educate parents -0.046*** -0.06***
(0.0009) (0.0007)
(5)Low skilled parents -0.036*** -0.03***
(0.001) (0.001)
(5) Constant 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.69***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 406023 406216 288182 291304
R-squared 0.0005 0.004 0.028 0.046
Notes.The dependent variable is mathematics score, Standard errors in
parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Estimation of gender gap in reading
Grade2 Grade5 Grade2 Grade5
(1) Female 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(2) ForeignI -0.151*** -0.124***
(0.003) (0.002)
(3) ForeignII -0.120*** -0.076***
(0.002) (0.002)
Controls
(4) Low educated parents -0.098*** -0.080***
(0.001) (0.001)
(5)Low skilled parents -0.029*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.001)
(5) Constant 0.643*** 0.694*** 0.690*** 0.733***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 409325 412164 290790 295627
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.068 0.073
Notes.The dependent variable is reading score, Standard errors in paren-
theses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
78 CHAPTER 3. GENDER GAP IN SCHOLASTIC OUTCOME
Table 3.6: Parental expectation and gender gap-high educated parents
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5
female -0.015*** -0.038*** 0.053*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
high educated parents 0.1*** 0.127*** 0.170*** 0.118***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
female * high educate parents -0.007 -0.014*** -0.007 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant -0.525*** -0.458*** -0.530*** -0.403***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 305137 307983 307707 312463
R-squared 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.016
Notes. The dependent variables are log of reading and mathematics scores,
robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, "high
educate parents" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if parents hold university
degree.
Table 3.7: Parental expectation and gender gap-Mother dominated in terms of education
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5
female -0.016*** -0.039*** 0.051*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
mother dominate 0.003 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
female * mother dominate 0.004 -0.012 0.021* 0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Constant -0.515*** -0.448*** -0.514 *** -0.394***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 405839 406172 408775 411882
R-squared 0 0.003 0.003 0.001
Notes. The dependent variables are log of reading and mathematics scores,
robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female,
"mother dominate" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if mother dominate father
in terms of acquired years of education.
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Table 3.8: Parental expectation and gender gap-father dominated in education
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5
female -0.015*** -0.036*** 0.053*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
father dominate -0.040*** -0.016 -0.030* -0.004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009)
female * father dominate -0.012 0.018 -0.010 0.001
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013)
Constant -0.527*** -0.461*** -0.534*** -0.408***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 405839 406172 408775 411882
R-squared 0 0.003 0.003 0.001
Notes. The dependent variables are log of reading and mathematics scores,
robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female,
"father dominate" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if father dominate mother
in terms of acquired years of education.
Table 3.9: Parental expectation and gender gap: number of books at home
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 5 Grade 5 Grade 6
female=1 -0.039*** 0.020*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# books at home 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
female * # books at home -0.005 0.006** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant -0.462*** -0.407*** -0.544***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 390190 378768 476705
R-squared 0.011 0.010 0.024
Notes. The dependent variables are log of reading and math-
ematics scores, robust standard errors in parentheses and sig-
niﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, "female" is a
dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, "# books at home" is
a dummy variable for high number of books at home.
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Table 3.10: Social capital and gender gap-provincial analysis for second graders in
mathematics
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
female -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.051*** -0.011*** 0.051***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Blood Donation -1.468*** -1.146***
(0.289) (0.249)
Female interacted with BD -0.163** -0.159*
(0.080) (0.080)
Turnover at Referenda -0.464*** -0.407***
(0.066) (0.086)
Female interacted with TR -0.083*** -0.083***
(0.024) (0.024)
GDP per province -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.527*** -0.489*** -0.153*** -0.460*** -0.184***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.055) (0.016) (0.064)
Observations 405839 404250 380747 404250 380747
R-squared 0 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.014
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, the rest of the
variables are deﬁned in the text.
Table 3.11: Social capital and gender gap-provincial analysis for second graders in
reading
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
female 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.022 0.049*** 0.022
(0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018)
Blood Donation -0.727*** -0.651***
(0.218) (0.233)
Female interacted with BD 0.153* 0.154*
(0.081) (0.081)
Turnover at Referenda -0.153** -0.125*
(0.058) (0.075)
Female interacted with TR 0.039* 0.039*
(0.022) (0.022)
GDP per province -0.001 0
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.534 -0.515*** -0.409*** -0.508*** -0.424***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.048) (0.0100) (0.056)
Observations 408775 407184 383458 407184 383458
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.004 .0.004 0.004
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1 "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, the rest of the
variables are deﬁned in the text.
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Table 3.12: Social capital and gender gap-provincial analysis for ﬁfth graders in math
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
female -0.036*** -0.023*** 0.122*** -0.023*** 0.122***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017)
Blood Donation -0.583*** -0.478***
(0.156) (0.163)
Female interacted with BD -0.516*** -0.516***
(0.117) (0.117)
Turnover at Referenda -0.121*** -0.107***
(0.038) (0.045)
Female interacted with TR -0.198*** -0.198***
(0.021) (0.021)
GDP per province -0.001 -0.000
(0) (0)
Constant -0.461*** -0.446*** -0.362*** -0.437*** -0.370***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.032) (0.008) (0.034)
Observations 406172 404770 380284 404770 380284
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, the rest of the
variables are deﬁned in the text.
Table 3.13: Social capital and gender gap-provincial analysis for ﬁfth graders in reading
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
female 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.017)
Blood Donation -0.207 -0.257
(0.157) (0.162)
Female interacted with BD 170** 0.170**
(0.072) (0.072)
Turnover at Referenda 0.022 0.020
(0.034) (0.040)
Female interacted with TR 0.021 0.021
(0.020) (0.020)
GDP per province 0 0
(0) (0)
Constant -0.408*** -0.402*** -0.423*** -0.407*** -0.422***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.029) (0.007) (0.031)
Observations 411882 410468 385691 410468 385691
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, the rest of the
variables are deﬁned in the text.
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Table 3.14: gap in gender gap 1st generation immigrants vs. native
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5
female -0.015*** -0.038*** 0.053*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1st gen immigrants -0.193*** -0.201*** -0.363*** -0.264***
(0.005) (0.0040) (0.008) (0.004)
female interacted with 1st gen immigrants 0.006 0.025*** 0.020* 0.021***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Constant -0.521*** -0.451*** -0.522*** -0.395***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 405839 406172 408775 411882
R-squared 0.009 0.019 0.020 0.029
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, "1st gen immigrants"
is a dummy indicated ﬁrst generation of immigrants.
Table 3.15: gap in gender gap 2nd generation immigrants vs. native
Math Reading
VARIABLES Grade 2 Grade 5 Grade 2 Grade 5
female -0.015*** -0.036*** 0.051*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
2nd gen immigrants -0.163*** -0.110*** -0.284*** -0.132***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
female interacted with 2nd gen immigrants 0.008 -0.004 0.034*** 0
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant -0.518*** -0.457*** -0.518*** -0.402***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 405839 406172 408775 411882
R-squared 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.007
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. "female" is a dummy variable equall to 1 if is female, "2nd gen immigrants" is a
dummy indicated second generation of immigrants.
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Table 3.16: Discriptive statistics-Full sample vs. Discontinuity sample
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N Class
A: Full sample
Grade 2: 5969 schools
Class size 20 3.7 11 17 20 23 35 22745
Enrollment 103 46 11 70 101 131 317 22745
Average reading 0.66 0.23 0 0.5 0.70 0.85 1 22745
Average math 0.62 0.2 0 0.46 0.6 0.78 1 22745
N girls 9.5 2.8 0 8 9 11 21 22745
N boys 9.9 2.8 0 8 10 12 23 22745
Grade 5: 5937 schools
Class size 20 3.8 11 17 20 23 35 22846
Enrollment 103 46 11 72 102 132 290 22846
Average reading 0.7 0.17 0 0.6 0.7 0.84 1 22846
Average math 0.65 0.18 0 0.52 0.66 0.79 1 22846
N girls 9.5 2.9 0 8 10 11 28 22846
N boys 9.8 2.9 0 8 10 12 27 22846
Grade 6: 5368 schools
Class size 22 36 11 20 23 25 35 25288
Enrollment 145 77 11 84 130 198 430 25288
Average reading 0.61 0.15 0 0.52 0.64 0.72 1 25288
N girls 9.8 3 0 8 10 12 22 25288
N boys 10.5 3 0 9 11 12 24 25288
B: Discontinuity sample (enrollment 10-40)
Grade 2: 1491 schools
Class size 19 4.6 11 16 18 22 33 1988
Enrollment 27 7 15 22 27 33 39 1988
Average reading 0.7 0.23 0 0.54 0.73 0.88 1 22745
Average math 0.68 0.21 0 0.5 0.68 0.85 1 22745
N girls 9.2 3.5 0 7 9 11 21 1988
N boys 9.6 3.3 0 7 9 12 20 1988
Grade 5:1440 schools
Class size 19 4.7 11 16 19 23 35 1901
Enrollment 27 6.8 15 22 27 33 39 1901
Average reading 0.72 0.18 0 0.6 0.75 0.85 1 1901
Average math 0.68 0.19 0 0.54 0.7 0.84 1 1901
N girls 9.4 3.6 0 7 9 12 28 1901
N boys 9.6 3.6 0 7 9 12 27 1901
Grade 6: 761 schools
Class size 19 4.4 11 16 18 21 34 1113
Enrollment 29 6.7 15 24 31 35 39 1113
Average reading 0.6 0.15 0 0.52 0.62 0.72 0.98 1113
N girls 8.5 3.5 0 6 8 11 22 1113
N boys 9.2 3.3 0 7 9 11 24 1113
Source: Invalsi data for academic year 2009-10. Note that performance in
a test for ﬁrst two grades is measured as the fraction of correct answers.
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Figure 3.2: Class size by enrollment
Note: Class Size in 2009-2010 by Enrollment
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Figure 3.3: Math test score by enrollment
Note: Average Math Test Scores in 2009-2010 by Enrollment
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Table 3.17: Discontinuity assumption-uneducated parents
All Boys Girls
Grade2
Gap at the threshold -0.000 0.002 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 25192 12837 12251
R-squared 0 0 0
Grade5
Gap at the threshold 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 24075 12147 11928
R-squared 0 0 0
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and
signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.18: Gender diﬀerence in reaction to class size results: grade 2
VARIABLES Math Reading
Low class size 0.097*** -0.041
(0.026) (0.031)
female -0.022*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.008)
female inteeracted with Low size 0.014 0.019*
(0.009) (0.011)
Constant 0.552 -2.256***
(0.963) (1.146)
Observations 28418 28559
R-squared 0.010 0.008
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and signif-
icance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
V. TABLES CHAPTER 3 87
Table 3.19: Gender diﬀerence in reaction to class size results: grade 5
VARIABLES Math Reading
Low class size 0.023 0.028
(0.024) (0.023)
female -0.026*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.005)
female inteeracted with Low size -0.008 -0.015*
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant -1.430 -0.177
(0.913) (0.855)
Observations 26543 26543
R-squared 0.009 0.004
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses and sig-
niﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.4: reading test score by enrollment
Note: Average reading Test Scores in 2009-2010 by Enrollment
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